On the distinctiveness of listening to music
In philosophy of auditory perception works such as O’Callaghan (2021) and O’Callaghan & Nudds (2009), consider the perception of music as a distinctive case. Yet, the current literature on the matter does not provide a generally accepted reason for which this should be the case. In this talk, I consider two possible ways to go to reply to the question regarding the distinctiveness of perceiving music. On one side, I consider the idea that there is nothing too special about music, and that psychological and naturalistic explanations can provide a good picture of the case. On the other, I consider the idea that there is something special in perceiving music.
I start presenting what I call here “the Naturalistic View”, based on the works of Budd (2008) and DiBona (2022), which holds that perceiving music is explainable through the study of psychological mechanisms that are also common to the ordinary auditory case. I then show how this view provides insight on necessary, yet not sufficient, mechanisms at play in the experience of perceiving music. In particular, this way to proceed seems unable to account for the experience of music as presenting dynamic elements.
I proceed considering Scruton’s (1997) account of the experience of music, to which I refer here as “the Metaphorical View”. In this account, what allows perceivers to perceive music as including dynamic elements within the sounds, are their rational and imaginative capacities. In other words, what makes a difference is the personal contribution of a perceiver listening to music.
After presenting some widespread criticisms to Scruton’s view and abandoning it for those reasons, I discuss the case of inculturated and uninculturated listeners, to defend an interesting core element present in Scruton’s proposal, which takes that listeners shape this experience.
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Participante: Giulia LorenziLicencia: Copyright (Licencia propietaria)Visto: 22 veces
