Canal UNED - Perfect Price Equilibrium and Social Influence on Choices

10/05/2018 | 00:29:58

Perfect Price Equilibrium and Social Influence on Choices

We study a usual duopoly game with a two‐stage game. In the first stage firms choose their prices and in the second stage individuals choose in which firm they are going to buy. The inicialsetup isthe Bertrand price model. We add a new term to the utilities of the individuals: the social influence in choices. We are able to fully characterise the local perfect equilibria: some individuals decide to be loyal to some firm and others choose a mix strategy. Our new model brings a new understanding of the Bertrand paradox.

Alberto Pinto University of Porto, Portugal

Licencia: Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 ES)

Visto: 23 veces

Ciencias económicas

Contenido de la misma colección

Opening session (DGS-VI 2018) and (Jolate-XIX)

08/05/2018 | 00:22:08

Opening session (DGS-VI 2018) and (Jolate-XIX)

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Pareto Optimality and Nash Equilibrium

08/05/2018 | 00:48:02

Pareto Optimality and Nash Equilibrium

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Are Social Exclusion and Poverty Measures Referred to the same People? A Comparison Using Spanish Data

08/05/2018 | 00:35:28

Are Social Exclusion and Poverty Measures Referred to the same People? A Comparison Using Spanish Data

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium in Locally Convex Topological Vector Spaces, with Interdependent Utility Functions

08/05/2018 | 00:59:44

Existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium in Locally Convex Topological Vector Spaces, with Interdependent Utility Functions

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

08/05/2018 | 00:50:32

Cyclic Games

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Consensus and Equilibria in the Presence of Self‐Interest and Conformity in Social Groups

08/05/2018 | 00:21:21

Consensus and Equilibria in the Presence of Self‐Interest and Conformity in Social Groups

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Game Theory Applications to Car Insurance Industry

08/05/2018 | 00:18:27

Game Theory Applications to Car Insurance Industry

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Network and Institutions. Questions

08/05/2018 | 00:09:10

Network and Institutions. Questions

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Green Goods under Discounted Network Effects

08/05/2018 | 01:03:52

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Green Goods under Discounted Network Effects

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment

09/05/2018 | 01:05:44

Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Super‐Replication in Economies with Imperfect Financial Markets

09/05/2018 | 00:24:29

Super‐Replication in Economies with Imperfect Financial Markets

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Hotelling model

09/05/2018 | 00:24:41

Hotelling model

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

A Model for the Optimal Selection of Lenders

09/05/2018 | 00:16:28

A Model for the Optimal Selection of Lenders

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Innovation, Imitation Proximity and Mean‐Field Games Models of Economic Growth

09/05/2018 | 00:33:19

Innovation, Imitation Proximity and Mean‐Field Games Models of Economic Growth

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Not All Majority‐Based Social Choice Functions are Obviously Strategy‐Proof

09/05/2018 | 01:04:38

Not All Majority‐Based Social Choice Functions are Obviously Strategy‐Proof

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Controlling the Controller. A Dynamic Model of Corruption

09/05/2018 | 00:24:26

Controlling the Controller. A Dynamic Model of Corruption

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Optimal Strategies for International Expansion with and without Making Dumping

09/05/2018 | 00:14:00

Optimal Strategies for International Expansion with and without Making Dumping

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Quantifying Information in Repeated Coordination Games

09/05/2018 | 00:14:15

Quantifying Information in Repeated Coordination Games

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

The Replicator Dynamics for Games in Metric Spaces: a Finite‐Dimensional Approximation

09/05/2018 | 00:37:00

The Replicator Dynamics for Games in Metric Spaces: a Finite‐Dimensional Approximation

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events

10/05/2018 | 01:03:29

Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

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