Canal UNED - Network and Institutions. Questions

8/5/18 | 00:09:10

Network and Institutions. Questions

Participante: José Manuel Brell Doval (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain)
Participante: Emiliano Álvarez (Universidad de la República, Uruguay)

Licencia: Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 ES)

Visto: 49 veces

Ciencias económicas

Vídeos de la misma serie

Opening session (DGS-VI 2018) and (Jolate-XIX)

8/5/18 | 00:22:08

Opening session (DGS-VI 2018) and (Jolate-XIX)

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Pareto Optimality and Nash Equilibrium

8/5/18 | 00:48:02

Pareto Optimality and Nash Equilibrium

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Are Social Exclusion and Poverty Measures Referred to the same People? A Comparison Using Spanish Data

8/5/18 | 00:35:28

Are Social Exclusion and Poverty Measures Referred to the same People? A Comparison Using Spanish Data

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium in Locally Convex Topological Vector Spaces, with Interdependent Utility Functions

8/5/18 | 00:59:44

Existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium in Locally Convex Topological Vector Spaces, with Interdependent Utility Functions

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

8/5/18 | 00:50:32

Cyclic Games

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Consensus and Equilibria in the Presence of Self‐Interest and Conformity in Social Groups

8/5/18 | 00:21:21

Consensus and Equilibria in the Presence of Self‐Interest and Conformity in Social Groups

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Game Theory Applications to Car Insurance Industry

8/5/18 | 00:18:27

Game Theory Applications to Car Insurance Industry

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Network and Institutions. Questions

8/5/18 | 00:09:10

Network and Institutions. Questions

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Green Goods under Discounted Network Effects

8/5/18 | 01:03:52

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Green Goods under Discounted Network Effects

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment

9/5/18 | 01:05:44

Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Super‐Replication in Economies with Imperfect Financial Markets

9/5/18 | 00:24:29

Super‐Replication in Economies with Imperfect Financial Markets

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Hotelling model

9/5/18 | 00:24:41

Hotelling model

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

A Model for the Optimal Selection of Lenders

9/5/18 | 00:16:28

A Model for the Optimal Selection of Lenders

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Innovation, Imitation Proximity and Mean‐Field Games Models of Economic Growth

9/5/18 | 00:33:19

Innovation, Imitation Proximity and Mean‐Field Games Models of Economic Growth

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Not All Majority‐Based Social Choice Functions are Obviously Strategy‐Proof

9/5/18 | 01:04:38

Not All Majority‐Based Social Choice Functions are Obviously Strategy‐Proof

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Controlling the Controller. A Dynamic Model of Corruption

9/5/18 | 00:24:26

Controlling the Controller. A Dynamic Model of Corruption

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Optimal Strategies for International Expansion with and without Making Dumping

9/5/18 | 00:14:00

Optimal Strategies for International Expansion with and without Making Dumping

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Quantifying Information in Repeated Coordination Games

9/5/18 | 00:14:15

Quantifying Information in Repeated Coordination Games

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

The Replicator Dynamics for Games in Metric Spaces: a Finite‐Dimensional Approximation

9/5/18 | 00:37:00

The Replicator Dynamics for Games in Metric Spaces: a Finite‐Dimensional Approximation

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events

10/5/18 | 01:03:29

Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events

SCHEDULE DGS VI – JOLATE XIX

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